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Abstract—In  this  paper  we  study  a  scheme  for  making 
cryptanalysis and security improvement. This protocol by Song, 
is a password authentication protocol using smart card. We note 
that  this  protocol  has  been  shown  to  be  prone  to  the  offline 
password  guessing  attack.  We  perform  an  additional 
cryptanalysis on this scheme and detect that it is vulnerable to the 
clogging attack, a type of denial-of-service attack. We notice that 
all  smart  card  typed  authentication  schemes  which  lead  the 
scheme by Song, and need the server to find the computationally 
exhaustive modular exponentiation, similar to the scheme by Xu 
et al., and it is vulnerable to the clogging attack. Then we propose 
an enhancement in the scheme to avoid the clogging attack.  
Keywords-authentication  protocol;  offline  password  guessing 
attack; clogging attack. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The  idea  behind  improving  password  authentication 
protocol is to help authorized users obtain services from an 
authorized  server.  When  an  entity  needs  a  service  from  a 
server, it has to identify itself to the server in a certain way. 
Password  authentication  has  been  one  of  the  most  suitable 
techniques  for  a  user  ID  throughout  the  years.  Currently, 
millions of providers utilize password authentication schemes 
to identify authorized users. General cases include private web 
service, Internet shopping, e-mail service, e-trade service, and 
other  services.  Fundamentally,  each  password  authentication 
method has two steps: 
  Registration step: In this step, the user enters a user ID and 
password in the computer. The password is saved by the 
server  and  kept  confidential  between  the  entity  and  the 
computer. 
  Authentication step: In this step, the entity needs a service 
from the computer. It passes its identity and password to 
the computer to get a service. The computer then decides if 
the user is authorized by checking the received information 
of  user  ID  password  with  the  saved  details.  The  server 
extends  the  preferred  service  to  the  entity,  if  found 
authorized 
In authentication processes, the password is sent cross an 
insecure communication channel. A hacker can intercept the 
message by listening to the communication. It can imitate the 
entity  by  re-using  the  password  acquired  from  the 
communication.  These  issues  compromise  the  entity 
confidentiality.  The  service  providers  normally  keep 
passwords of users in a database for potential verification and 
authentication. The passwords are kept in a password index in 
the computer database. It does not provide any security against 
unprivileged insiders of the computer, and it does not protect 
the  passwords  when  the  computer  database  is  someway 
hacked. To reduce the problem of password list disclosure, the 
computer  can  encrypt  the  passwords  and  protect  them. 
Nevertheless, the communication interception remains a threat 
to  the  organization  security.  Another  problem  is recalling  a 
user identity and password. A compromise in the password for 
any entity can be like losing a credit card. The hacker can take 
advantage before the corporation is informed about the loss. 
Therefore  we  have  to  improve  efficient  password 
authentication protocol to finish the authentication process in a 
secured way.  
Taking  this  into  consideration,  and  to  produce  a  more 
secure  scheme,  various  smart  cards  typed  password 
authentication  schemes  have  been  proposed  throughout  the 
last decade [4, 6, 7]. In such a system, the entity is given with 
a smart card. When the user needs a service, it gives its smart 
card with a password that remains private. The smart card then 
employs this password to build a login message that is passed 
to the computer. The computer then authenticates this message 
and  gives  the  preferred  service  if  the  password  is  found 
legitimate. 
In this paper, we study such a scheme under smart card by 
Song [1]. Song presented the scheme as an enhancement of 
another scheme set is by Xu et al. [3]. The scheme has been 
shown  to  be  prone  to  the  imitation  attack.  Song  then 
considered this competitive scheme in the same study, to avoid 
the imitation attack on the scheme. In this paper, we will show 
that the Song protocol is prone to the clogging attack, a type of 
the denial-of-service-attack. We noted that the scheme in [3] 
was vulnerable to clogging attack and also prone to clogging 
attack.  In  this  attack,  the  hacker  can  easily  prevent  the 
computer  from  giving  any  service  without  having  any 
information related to the identity or password of the entity. 
The  hacker  wants  to  make  any  complex  computations  to 
launch a clogging attack on Song scheme. We have come to 
know a cryptanalysis of the Song scheme by Tapiador et al 
[2].  However,  they  did not  study  the  clogging  attack in  the 
scheme  in  their  research.  It  also  worth  mentioning  that  the 
chain of smart card typed authentication schemes that keeps 
the server computationally exhaustive modular exponentiation 
[5] are all prone to the clogging attack. 
The  hacker  takes  the  benefit  of  the  calculation 
intensiveness  of  the  modular  exponentiation  computation  in 
initiating  this  attack.  To  avoid  clogging  attack  on  these 
schemes  key  agreement  schemes  are  required  in  different (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
Vol. 2, No. 10, 2011 
 
108 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
types of communication. Keys want to be securely exchanged 
before  a  channel  can  be  recognized.  There are  few  security 
threats to this that are intruder-in-the-middle so that the hacker 
pretends  to  be  someone  else  than  connecting  participants. 
Replay of old keys is one more attack which is common in this 
viewpoint.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  improve  secure  key 
exchanging  schemes  to  create  secure  channel.  The  key 
agreement protocols commonly have two steps: 
  Determine the public and private keys: In this step, both 
the  participants  compute  a  pair  of  keys:  the  secret  key, 
which is kept private, and the public key, which is made 
public. In some schemes, a part of this step is completed by 
a key distribution center that keeps the public keys of the 
entities in a directory. 
  Determine  the  secret  session key:  In  this  step,  the users 
swap their public keys  with a certain integer. The secret 
session key for message is computed using those integers, 
and the secret and public keys. Several schemes also let a 
certain participant determine the private key or session key 
and pass it to the other participant by encrypting it with the 
message.  In  this  paper  we  will  not  study  any  scheme 
regarding the key agreement protocols.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, 
we study the Song scheme including some an enhancement we 
suggest concerning public and private keys ; then we give a 
toy  example  in  section  3.  Then  we  have  a  cryptanalysis  of 
Song scheme .including clogging attack and offline password 
guessing attack in section 4. We then propose a solution to this 
attack in section 5. In section 6, we conclude this work. 
II.   REVIEW  OF SONG SCHEME 
    We    summarize  here  the  password  authentication 
protocol of Song [1]. This authentication protocol uses a smart 
card. In section 3, we consider the achievement and security 
vulnerability  of  this  protocol.  In  section  4,  we  introduce  a 
clogging attack on the scheme. We also consider a possible 
solution  against  the  attack.  Finally,  we  show  that  similar 
protocols  of  [3],  that  let  the  server  calculate  modular 
exponentiation, are vulnerable to the same type of attack and 
has the same achievement dependencies as this protocol. The 
Song  protocol  contains  three  steps:  registration,  login  and 
authentication. Prior to starting with the registration phase, the 
server performs the following steps:  
1.  two primes  p and q  are chosen where 1 * 2   q p .  
2.  an integer 
*
q Z i  is chosen. 
3.  a hash function h is chosen. 
4.  an  integer  e is  chosen  as  encryption  key  such  that 
1 ) 1 , gcd(   p e .   
5.  the  decryption  key  d is  computed,  where 
1 mod
1  
 p e d .  
6.  i and d are determined as both are private keys. 
 
A.  Registration  Phase  
   This phase comprises the following steps: 
1.  Entity A selects  ) , ( A A w id  
2.  Entity A passes  ) , ( A A w id to the server over a secure 
way,  such  that  A id and  A w are  the  user-id  and 
password of entity A respectively. 
3.  The server calculates ) ( ) mod ( A
i
A A w h p id h z   . 
4.  The server saves the parameter  ) , , , ( e h z id A A  into a 
smart card.  
5.  The server sends the smart card to the entity A . 
B.  Logical Phase  
    Entity A  performs the following steps: 
1.  Provides its ) , ( A A w id . 
2.  Chooses an arbitrary integer  A r . 
3.  Sets  A T   system present time. 
4.  Finds ) ( A A A w h z y   . 
5.  Computes ) ( A A y A T r e x
A   . 
6.  Computes ) || || || ( A A A A A id x r T h u  . 
7.  Sends the message  ) , , , ( A A A A T x u id  to the server. 
C.  Authentication Phase  
 The following steps are performed by the server: 
1. the server performs the following after receiving the login 
request from an entity: 
 Verifies  that A id ,  and A T .  If  not,  rejects  the  login 
message. 
 Finds ) mod ( p id h y
i
A A  . 
 Computes A A y A T x d r
A   ) (
'   
 Verifies that ) || || || (
'
A A A A A id x r T h u  . Otherwise 
rejects the login message. 
 Finds  ) || || (
'
S A A S T r id h u  ,  
 Passes the message  ) , , ( S S A T u id to an entity A . 
2.  The  following steps  are  performed  by  an  entity A after 
the receipt of ) , , ( S S A T u id from a server: 
 authenticates  A id and  S T  
 Checks that ) || || ( S A A S T r id h u  . If identical, the 
server is validated. 
3.  The entity A  and the server then find the session keys  as 
follows: 
  Entity  A  compute  the  session  key  as  follows 
) || || || ( A A S A r T T id h s   
  The  server  computes  the  session  key  as  follows 
) || || || (
'
A A S A r T T id h s  . 
  Finally,  a  session  key s  is  agreed  by  the  two 
participants. 
 
D. Comments  
When the entity wants to alter the password A w to a new 
password
'
A w , the smart card will first verify the validity of(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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A w through interacting with the server, and if it succeeds, it 
resets  A w to
'
A w ,and substitutes  A z with 
' '
A A A A w w z z    . 
III.  TOY EXAMPLE YOUR  
Suppose  that  the  server  selects 23  p ,  then 11  q . 
Suppose that 2  i , and for simplicity ignore in this phase the 
hash function (.) h . Suppose the encryption key 7  e , and then 
compute  the  decryption  key d  as  follows 
1 22 mod 63 * 7 1 mod 1 *     p d e .  
Registration  Phase:  Suppose  that  entity  A  selects 
) 24 , 29 (   A A w id ,  then  entity A passes  ) 24 , 29 (   A A w id  
to  the  server  over  a  secure  way  so  that  A id and  A w are  the 
user-id and password of entity A . Then, the server calculates
) ( ) mod ( A
i
A A w h p id h z    
21 ) 24 ( ) 23 mod 29 (
2    h h .  The  server  then  saves  the 
parameter  ) 7 (.), , 21 , 29 (     e h z id A A  into a smart card. 
Finally, the server sends the smart card to the entity A . 
Login Phase: First, the smart card is attached to the card 
reader  by  an  entity A and it  provides ) 24 , 29 (   A w id .  The 
smart card then chooses a random integer  ) 12 (  A r and then 
sets ) 4 (  A T .  Then  entity   A  computes 
13 ) 24 ( 21 ) (      h w h z y A A A .  Then  compute 
12 ) 4 12 ( 13 ) (      A A y A T r e x
A .  compute 16 23 mod 12
7   A x . 
Then  compute  ) || || || ( A A A A A id x r T h u   
15 23 mod 61 ) 29 16 12 4 (       h  .    Then  entity A sends  the 
message  ) 4 , 16 , 15 , 29 (     A A A A T x u id   to the server. 
Authentication Phase: First, the server verifies that  A id is 
valid.  If  not,  it  rejects  the  login  message.  Then, 
13 ) 23 mod 29 ( ) mod (
2    h p id h y
i
A A is  computed.  Then 
   ) ) mod ((
'
A
d
A y A T p x d r
A  
12 23 mod 13 * 8 ) 4 12 ( ) 12 23 mod ) 16 (( 13
63       is computed. 
Then,  the  server  verifies  that  ) || || || (
'
A A A A A id x r T h u   
15 23 mod 61 ) 29 16 12 4 (       h  . If  the  verification  of  the 
previous step succeeds, set  s T  as current server time. Suppose 
that 4  s T ,  and  then  compute 
22 23 mod 45 ) 4 12 29 ( ) || || (
'       h T r id h u S A A S . 
Finally, the server passes the message  ) 4 , 22 , 29 (    S S A T u id  
to entity A . An entity A  authenticates  A id and  S T by Checking 
that  ) || || ( S A A S T r id h u  22 ) 4 12 29 (    h .  In  this 
example, it is identical; it means that the server is validated. 
However, the entity A  and the server then find the session key
s  as  follows:  first,  entity A computes  the  session  key  as 
follow ) || || || ( A A S A r T T id h s  3 23 mod 49 ) 12 4 4 29 (      h
.Then,  the  server  computes  the  session  key  as  follows 
) || || || (
'
A A S A r T T id h s  3 23 mod 49 ) 12 4 4 29 (      h . 
IV.  SONG SCHEME CRYPAYLISIS   
The clogging attack and offline password guessing attack 
will be discussed in this section. 
A.  The Clogging Attack 
This scheme has a large dependency on the computer and 
entity  clocks.  For  a  connection-oriented  use,  this  may  be 
unwieldy.  The  scheme  should  be  designed  to  care  for  time 
synchronization  between  clocks  of  different  entities  and 
servers.  This  scheme  should  be  made  fault  tolerant  to  deal 
with complex network faults and also with different types of 
attacks. Despite that the communication is secure, a chance of 
an attack can occur and a hacker may intercept a message and 
alter  its  timestamp A T .  In  this  way  the  hacker  successfully 
repudiates the authorized entity because the server will refuse 
the  login  message  on  the  basis  of  timestamp  dissimilarity. 
Thus this type of attack is probable even if the scheme avoids 
replay  attacks.  Also,  interacting  delays  can  prepare  the 
timestamp to go beyond the threshold thus making the entire 
service  inherently  decelerate.  Therefore,  we  illustrate  that 
Song  scheme  is  vulnerable  to  the  clogging  attack.  The 
clogging attack is a  type  of  attack  by  which  the hacker  H  
constantly passes messages to a server and clogs it with those 
messages  [8].    Suppose  this  could  occur  with  the  Song 
scheme. The following is done by a hacker H : 
1.  H intercepts  the  message 
) 4 , 12 , 11 , 29 (     A A A A T x u id   passed by an entity to 
a server in the login phase. 
2.  H can alter the timestamp  4  A T to some  10  u T , 
because  the  message  is  unencrypted.  The  change 
satisfies the criterion g T T u  
* . 
3.  H alters 11  A u to arbitrary nonsense value  9  u u . 
4.  H passes ) 10 , 12 , 9 , 29 (     u A u A T x u id  to  the 
server. 
    The following is performed by the server: 
1.  Verify if  29  A id is valid. At this point it is valid.  
2.  Find ) mod ( p id h y
i
A A  13 ) 23 mod 29 (
2  h . 
3.  Find  ) (
'
u A y A T x d r
A   9 ) 10 12 ( 13     
4.  verify ) || || || (
'
A A A u u id x r T h u 
14 23 mod 60 ) 29 12 9 10 (      h .  This  does 
not succeed, thus the message is rejected. 
Then, the hacker  H will continue repeating the steps many 
times and let the server calculate the modular exponentiation 
repeatedly. Essentially,  H can potentially alter all the entering 
login  requests  from  the  authorized  entity  to  the  server.  As 
modular  exponentiation  is  computationally  exhaustive,  the 
victimized  server  spends  large  processing  resources  doing 
ineffective  modular  exponentiation  rather  than  any  actual 
work. Therefore the hacker H clog the server with ineffective 
work and so repudiates any authorized entity. The hacker only 
wants an id  of a valid entity to achieve the clogging attack 
many times. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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B.  Offline Password Gussing Attack   
In [1] it is claimed that the hacker should not be able to 
attack  and  get  access  to  the  server  by  extracting  the 
information kept on the smart card. But, a hacker who gets the 
result  of  ) ( ) mod ( A
i
A A w h p id h z    can  simply  increase  an 
offline password guessing attack by easily viewing one right 
authentication  session  and  obtaining access  to  the results of 
A x  , and A u . The attack is performed as follows:  for every 
password
*
A w , the hacker calculates the uncertain encryption 
key  ) (
* *
A A A w h z y   .  Such  a  key  is  then  employed  to 
decrypt the nonce result 
*
A r  by first recovering  A x with
*
A y and 
then  the value with  A T (both of which are public); namely, 
A A y A T x d r
A   ) (
* * . Note that when an attempt of password 
*
A w  
is right (i.e.,  )
*
A A w w  , then it is obtained encryption key 
*
A y
and so, the nonce
*
A r  . Now,  A u can be used to verify  when 
that  is  the  case.  The  hacker  finds  ) || || || (
* *
A A A A A id x r T h u   
and,  when  it  coincides  with  A u ,  it  can  conclude  that 
*
A r  is 
right and thus the password tried. In this reasoning we suppose 
that h has no collisions. Yet, even when h is not perfect, extra 
eavesdropping  sessions  can  be  employed  to  exclude  false 
positives and find the right password. Briefly, in addition to 
what  is  claimed  in  [1],  the  messages  exchanged  during  the 
scheme certainly decrease the entropy of the password, at least 
for a hacker with access to the values stored in the card. Also, 
once  the  password  is  guessed,  the  scheme  provides  no 
protection against other attacks. 
C.  Comments 
It can be observed that the attack showed can also be made 
on the schemes by Xu et al. [3] and by Tsaur et al. [5]. Thus 
we notice that the clogging attack can be executed on all the 
smart  card  typed  authentication  schemes  using  computing 
modular exponentiation. 
V.  THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
We  will  discuss  the  possible  solution  for  the  problem 
raised. 
A.   Prevent The Clogging Attack 
At  the  start  of  the  authentication  phase,  the  server  will 
check if the  IP address of the entity is valid. It has to identify 
the  IP addresses  of  any registered authorized  users.  Despite 
that, hacker  H might  spoof  the  IP address  of  an authorized 
entity and replay the login request. To stop it, we may add a 
cookie exchange step at the start of the login phase of Song 
scheme. This step has been presented as in the familiar Oakley 
key exchange scheme [9]. 
1.  The entity A selects an arbitrary number 1 m and passes 
it with the message  ) , , , ( A A A A T x u id  to the server. 
2.  The server accepts the message and passes its own 
cookie  2 m  to the entity A . 
B.   Solution Discussion   
When  the  hacker H spoofs  the  entity IP address,  H will 
not  obtain  2 m back  from  the  server.  But  H just  succeeds  to 
have the server return an acknowledgement, not to calculate 
the  computationally  modular  exponentiation.  Thus  the 
clogging attack is prevented by these extra steps. We note that 
this  process  does  not  avoid  the  clogging  attack  but  only 
frustrates it to a certain extent. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We have studied a scheme in this paper. The scheme is a 
password authentication protocol; which we have shown to be 
vulnerable to the clogging attack. We demonstrated that the 
attack on this scheme could be prevented by using an extra 
step of exchanging numbers. We demonstrated that it is prone 
to man-in-the-middle attack. Then we showed how to prevent 
this attack by using an encryption and decryption algorithm. 
We indicated a security get-out as Song proposed, which is 
that the hacker can execute modular exponentiation on both 
sides  of  the  authentication  scheme.  In  addition,  after 
intercepting the retrieved information, the hacker can start new 
logon information and successfully log into the server system. 
Thus, Song proposition cannot give adequate security and it is 
not appropriate for practical implementation of the proposed 
scheme. 
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